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Complementary currencies as alternative organisational forms.

"There are now hundreds of projects underway that are utilising new kinds of money … My forecast is that 90-95% of these projects will not survive; but the remaining 5% will succeed in permanently changing our economies, our societies, our civilisation, and our world" (Lietaer 2001:27).

Introduction
Recent years has seen a mushrooming of complementary currencies such as Local Exchange Trading Schemes (LETS), electronic and paper-based currencies denominated in time (Ithaca Hours, Time Banks), and local script circulating in small towns (BerkShares, Lewes Pounds).  The economic crisis of 2001 that devastated Argentina’s economy led to mass use of community and NGO created scrip, as cash points jammed up in an attempt to limit the effects of a bank run on the Argentine Peso (North 2007), a phenomena emerging in equally devastated Greece as the Eurozone crisis continues to hit (Donadio 2011).  Concerns about the continuing credit crunch, and about more long term crises in the form of climate change and resource crises have led to the emergence of a new social movement in the form of Transition Initiatives that look to relocalise economies to build in (or we should say, rebuild) resilience to shocks and to cut down on the emissions and fossil fuel consumption associated with globalisation (North 2010; Hopkins 2011).  Local money, that circulates only in a small town and its hinterland, has been a key tool for localisation (North 2010) as, it is argued, the existence of an alternative form of money that is not accepted out of a smaller local economy will act as a method of ‘structuring’ spending away from globally circulating goods and services, towards local ones (North 2005).   
This chapter examines the usefulness of complementary currencies as alternative organisational forms tools for social change.  The chapter argues that the use of complementary currencies is underdeveloped.  Lietaer (2001) is right in arguing that 95% of what is being pioneered today will not achieve the potential its supporters expect; but also that long term, complementary currencies will have a greater role to play at greater economic and geographic scales than they do today.  If not, a future, capitalist and hyperglobalised world will be a poorer, depleted, climate ravaged place.  The chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of the pioneer complementary currencies by analysing the range of designs and organisational features of differing models, which have a different ethos, objectives, and work at different scales.   The chapter concludes by arguing that new initiatives at a more regional, than local, scale being pioneered manly in Germany are more likely to realise the full potential of alternative organisational forms of money that might make a difference to the climate, resource and economic problems humanity faces.  What we do not know, and, perhaps cannot yet know, is whether alternative organisational forms of money can have the power to change economic activity in the same way that the emergence of banking and of the joint stock and limited liability companies did (Ferguson 2008).  Where local or regional currencies are strong, does this act as a reflection of the form of the local economy, or, does a local or regional currency help bring about the sort of convivial, sustainable, locally-owned and controlled economy that proponents hope to see?  

A typology of organisational features




	Local Exchange Trading Schemes (in the UK), Talente (in Germany, Hungary), and Grains of Salt (France) are community-based local trading networks that first emerged in the 1990s, using a local currency based on a number of units per hour, sometimes with a locally significant name such as ('Tales‘ in Canterbury, 'Brights' in Brighton, or 'Bobbins’ in Manchester (Williams 1996; Williams 1996; North 2006).  To establish a LETS scheme, a directory of services provided by network members is put together and trading takes place using local currency, and preferably without the use of any national currency.  Accounts are kept on a usually on a computer, and start with an opening balance of zero.  In LETS, no money actually exists in the form of coins or notes.  Users write a cheque in the local money to pay for goods and services, which they back with a ‘commitment’ to earn, at a later date, sufficient local money to return their account to zero.  In LETS, currency does not have to be earned before it is spent, so some members go into 'debt' while others simultaneously earn.  The person commissioning the work has their account debited, and the person doing the work is credited the same amount; so the totality of credits paid in and out of all accounts balances out at zero. All members’ balances and turnovers are publicly available, and members are expected to take their accounts back to zero before they leave the network to prevent defection by a member in commitment before they have provided reciprocal services. These latter facets are designed to facilitate trust.  Some LETS networks now have over twenty years’ trading experience under their belt (North 2010). 
	Time Banks connect people who need and offer services, match their requirements and skills, and facilitate the service with time-based credits (Cahn 2000; Seyfang 2003). Credits are a valued at a straight hour-for-hour swap and consequently avoid national currency alignment. No directory or cheque book is issued: rather members phone through to a central administrative point which finds someone to meet their needs and records accumulated credits.   Finally, there is no obligation for people to give and receive services in equal measure, although all are encouraged to do both.  Rather, the philosophy is that members contribute to and receive from the Time Bank as collective.  If a member needs more than he or she can give back, that is not a problem.     
	The other North American time-based currencies are watermarked, often exceptionally high quality scrip notes which circulate in Ithaca (New York), Salmon Arm (British Columbia) and up to 40 other cities in North America. The Ithaca Hour project has been spectacular successful, particularly in involving significant numbers of local businesses  ADDIN EN.CITE (Glover 1995; Maurer 2003; Maurer 2005) - something LETS schemes or Time Money in the UK have conspicuously failed to do (North 1998). Ithaca’s success inspired Argentina’s Red Global de Trueque (North 2007).  Over a million scrip notes (denominated in creditos) circulated amongst a loose network of self-identified prosumers meeting at markets.  
	
National currency equivalents
Scrip-based complementary currencies linked explicitly to national currencies include ‘Deli Dollars’, 'Berk-Shares', and 'Berkshire Farm Preserve Notes' are a local scrip notes, aligned to the Dollar, and redeemable in a number of small towns in Massachussetts (Solomon 1996).  In turn, Berkshares inspired the UK transition currencies currently in Totnes, Lewes and Brixton, London (North 2010).  The world's most successful complementary currency, the Swiss ‘Wirschaftsring’ (Business Ring), involves over 70,000 small and medium businesses and with a turnover in 1995 of 2521 million ‘Wir’ units, equivalent to Swiss Francs (Douthwaite 1996:100).  After making a cash deposit, participants receive a credit card with an interest free credit of five percent of their deposit, and they can then trade these ‘Wir’ units, equivalent to Swiss francs in value, with other participants.   WIR, the only survivor of the 1930s Freework movement, inspired the German regional currencies that emerged in the early 21st Century.  Having a local currency at parity with sterlinghas many advantages, but, as we see below, it can be contested.


The social construction and contestation of valuation
Until the recent rise of the transition currencies, the majority of complementary currencies have tended to stress their dissimilarity with national currency values, taking an hourly rate, a rate that floats against national currency, or a rate as disconnected from national currency rates as possible.  For example, many UK LETS schemes argued that a LETS unit is 'like' a pound, and that a recommended hourly rate should be charged that reflects a 'fair' rate in the conventional economy.  Others argue for a rate that specifically does not align with sterling: for example the Bright Exchange's (Brighton, UK) rate of 12 units to the hour was felt to be specifically non-decimal and therefore discouraged valuations aligned to Sterling.  Belfast used the pint​[1]​.  Ideal LETS, in Bristol, set a rate of 20 Ideals an hour, reflecting a desire by many of its well-paid members for rates that reflected their expected sterling hourly rates.  The arguments for and against various rates are as follows.  Time-based money mainly appeals to those who want to value work in ways un-connected to the capitalists nexus whereby, for example, a lawyer is paid more than a cleaner.  It echoes Robert Owen’s – and Marx’s – argument that the basis of all wealth is labour, and it puts the need for problems to be sold before the need for money to be in existence (North 1999).  A strict hourly rate appeals to those for whom equality and equity in trading relations is of major importance.  The downside is that valuing labour time in hours is easy (enough), but what if I work harder, or more efficiently than you, and do more with my hour than you do?  What if an hour of a lawyer’s time is actually twenty years experience and training concentrated into an hour?  The absence of any national currency referent led to confusion in pricing goods in time based money (how many hours for a fridge?).  Having a time based currency basically restricts your currency to those with supportive political views, who want to trade roughly equivalent services.  It generally excludes conventional businesses.  
The practical issues involved in trading goods and involving the small numbers of businesses that join LETS schemes consequently suggested a move away from strict equality, but values allied directly to national currency were seen by the more political members attracted to LETS in its early days as replicating the inequalities of the conventional economy (North 2006). 
In practice, LETS members developed a range of diverse moral values for the currency.  These valuations included:
*	Exactly a pound, and hourly rates would be calculated directly translating members expectations of their worth at mainstream prices;
*	Like a pound, with the hourly rate referent happily accepted;
*	A gesture: One LETS unit would be paid, irrespective of the time taken to provide a service.
*	Distrusted:  Others distrusted complementary currencies which they saw as commodification of co-operation that would have happened irrespective of the existence of the currency.  They used the network to share without using the currency.
*	Variable valuation.  All or some of the above, depending on the quality of the relationship between traders, how much or little a trader wished to or enjoyed providing a service, or the relative level of accounts.  
The problem with this early diversity was that the currency failed to act as either an effective measure of value or an accepted means of exchange (North 2006).  Problems arose when traders with essentially different value systems had to interrelate and felt that their differing value systems led to unequal outcomes.  For example, cleaners could feel that an accepted rate of ten LETS an hour compared favourably with the going rates in the pre-minimum wage UK, while a homoeopathist could feel that her hourly rate should include recompense for her hours of training: as Viviana Zelizer (1997) shows, we value money differently. This differential meant that LETS money failed to act as a store of value if a trader who charged above the odds and could then buy more labour per hour than someone earning a lower rate.  On the other hand, others felt that as they had access to unlimited currency, the fact that one person charged more than another seemed irrelevant as all that is traded is points: unlimited currency did not need to function as a store of value. In a third scenario, market mechanisms worked and the trader charging above the odds began to store up unspendable credits and lowered their prices.  The problem was that strong bonds of trust were not developed in the absence of a universally accepted currency valuation, either imposed on the network by a strong organisational structure running the network, through rules, regulations and/or penalties, or through the construction of a shared and accepted ethos.
Consequently, a range of accepted community 'norms' arose to make sense of, and to bring some order to the diversity.  In LETS, this was for a LETS unit to be 'like' a pound, and a recommended hourly rate.  Time Banks insisted that everyone’s time was equivalent to everyone else’s, with one time credit for one hours work.   Ithaca Hours settled on an hourly rate of 10 Hours, within an Hour equivalent to US-dollar, for an hour’s work: thus enacting a community-based living wage from below. This facilitated easy pricing while avoiding the enforced equality associated with hour-based systems.  However, the confusion association with these social struggles over valuation did put many people off LETS, and, in particular, acted as a disincentive to business participation.  Many of the paper-based currencies that followed avoided this by explicitly relating their currency to national currencies, while allowing those who used the currency to decide for themselves how much to pay for what in different circumstances.  Many LETS advocates felt this was step backwards, an unacceptable political compromise.

Physical Form and Design 
The physical manifestation of the currency can communicate the ethos and politics of the currency.  It varies from the virtual to beautifully designed paper currency notes that compare favourably with any produced by nation states.  Believing that money is ‘just information’, and should not be valuable in its own right, Michael Linton's original 1984 LetSystem design did not give the currency any physical form: users recorded transactions on an answerphone, before being logged onto the computer database.  While this had the advantage of being simple and easy to set up, a design flaw was that a virtual currency is so far removed from common understandings about money that new members found the concept difficult to grasp (North 1996).  Money, especially in the 1990s before the widespread use of electronic cash, is a physical ‘thing’, like a bank note, many felt.  The lack of corporeality of LETS meant it was often not taken seriously.  If all money is, is a number on a computer printout, people often displayed an over-casual attitude both to the value of the currency and to the need to return accounts to zero (Aldridge and Patterson 2002).  Banknotes and credit cards use design specifically to bestow grandeur and communicate the solemnity and timeless value of currency: they have ‘moneyness’ (Cohen 1998) .  
While claims that since fiat currencies are disconnected from any relation to a tangible value base such as gold are intellectually tenable (Dodd 1994; Ingham 2004), a currency with no alternative method if demonstrating its credibility will have problems in gaining usage and respect beyond those who accept these claims made about money in advance as part of a wider programme of social reform, or as part of a challenge to power relations associated with money (North 1999).  Those who have more conventional understandings of money, who see it as in some way ‘hard’, limited, connected to something tangible in the real world, will be less attracted to alternative organisational forms of money that diverge too strongly from uncontested or unconsidered attitudes about money.  Third, an answerphone or computer-based system is clumsy.  Users must remember to phone each transaction through, and they may forget to make the call, or get identity numbers wrong. Someone needs to process the transactions: a problem for businesses with a large number of small transactions.  When large numbers of people used an alternative currency 9as they did in the Argentine crash), bookkeeping is impractical: the accountant will be quickly overwhelmed.   Finally, a telephone-based system is inappropriate for the poorest communities.  While North America at the time had free local calls, in the UK the cost of phoning in the 1990s acted as a deterrent to poorer members (North 1996).  Those without access to a phone were excluded completely​[2]​.  
From the early 1990s, UK LETS schemes began to address these problems by using home-designed cheques as the most popular physical manifestation of the currency.  This had the advantage of being familiar, providing easy corporeality, and being relatively easy to produce and process.  Problems included the unfamiliarity of cheques for poorer members excluded from access to conventional banking services, and the often poor quality of many cheque designs, which again reduced confidence in the reliance and exchangeability of the currency.  Cheques were still unwieldy for small transactions, and larger schemes found the processing of large number of transactions, big or small, onerous.  High street businesses began to see cheque usage decline as electronic point of sale technologies became more widespread, although many tradespeople continue to use cheques regularly.  Finally, a big problem, specific to the US, was that any organisation offering a computer-based currency scheme was subject to the same regulations as business to business barter: the organisers were responsible for notifying members details to the Internal Revenue Service for tax purposes.  This was a major structural barrier, which led to the innovation of moving to a paper currency.
The issuance of scrip notes, like Ithaca Hours did not come up against the volume problem as no central records are kept.  If well-designed and watermarked (as recent scrip notes often are) the notes bestow credibility and confidence on the currency.  Notes are quicker and easier to take in and out of tills and wallets, speeding up transactions immeasurably - of crucial importance to businesses.  Everyone is used to paper money, so the concept resonated with accepted views of what money should do.  Well designed alternative money seems ‘serious’, although on the other side of the coin poorly designed notes can seem to much like 'monopoly money' and lead to a lack of respect for the currencies with the result that business might not be attracted to it.  A second set objection to a paper currency is that, unlike personal credit money, services must be provided in the first place which again can exclude the poorest who might feel they have few skills and resources others might need.  The Argentine Red Global de Trueque overcame this problem by issuing thirty to fifty notes in advance, but issued unbacked currency to the extent that this eventually had major inflationary effects which resulted in the catastrophic loss of faith in the currency.  Some German regional currencies are experimented with more limited and controlled advance issuance for socially excluded currency users.

Managing the circulation of the currency. 
		The supply of any new currency and how it circulates must be managed in some way.  There are two approaches.  With ‘personal credit’ money like LETS and Time Money, currency issue is governed by the users of the currency themselves with the simple act of commissioning work and paying for it to be done with local credits, backing it with their labour in the future, their personal ‘promise to pay the bearer on demand’.  Here second set of design features relates to the management of individual accounts.  To what extent are there credit or debt limits?  Are members expected to earn as much as they spend, periodically returning their account to a zero balance as in LETS; or should needs be met irrespective of the existence of otherwise of credits to pay for received services?  Can an account with a growing debit be tolerated?  Should balances be made public, proactively or otherwise?  What account information should be made available and how important is it that account statements are accurate?  
		The LETS design pays close attention to accurate account management.  Members are expected to periodically balance their accounts,.  Some LETS schemes impose credit or debit limits, and can actively enforce them either through the proactive publication of balances or through the oversight by the management group. Green Dollar schemes in New Zealand are particularly proactive in this regard, and have gone as far as taking members to small claims courts to enforce payment of  debts they don't feel are being repaid (North 2002).  LETS schemes often go out of their way to regularly provide account statements, and pay considerable attention to their accuracy.  These account management systems are, it is argued, necessary to maintain the integrity of the currency and confidence in it.  Public access to account balances is necessary to ensure that all traders are contributing to the scheme, and that a member who takes more from others than they contribute will find that opportunities to trade reduce when the depth of the imbalance is known.  In reality, the extent that individual members do check up on the credit balances of others and regulate their trading relations to ensure equitable contributions is questionable, especially in the absence of regularly published balances. The publication of individual balances can cut against cultural conceptions of privacy.  In New Zealand, Green Dollar committees involved themselves in the management of individual accounts in ways that a UK audience might find intrusive, yet felt that the open publication of accounts would invade members privacy. The design of accounts must balance close attention to cultural conceptions of what should or should not be made public with the need for feedback mechanisms.
With time money the emphasis is on meeting needs and on people making whatever contribution they feel they can irrespective of whether the volumes of services given and received are in balance in any individual case.  Accounts statements are often not provided, to avoid putting those in a situation where they have more needs than things they can put back feeling beholden, or holding back from accessing services.  Time money is thereby better at meeting the needs of those who have to take more than they can ever give back, and who might feel unwilling to go into 'debt' with LETS.  The concept of 'debt' does not exist in the same way as participants are seen to collectively give to and take from 'the Bank', rather than manage an individual account.  The ethos of Time Banks is of 'co-production; of people meeting their needs collectively, of providing as well as receiving help (Cahn 2000).  These are conceptions more closely allied to social service provision than to trade, and consequently are less resonant with businesses. 
With scrip such as 'Hours', the Red Global de Trueque, the transition currencies and German Regional Currencies, a central issuing authority decides how much scrip to issue.  If too many notes are issued, as we saw in Argentina, they may (perhaps catastrophically) lose value in an inflationary cycle as too many notes are chasing too few trading opportunities.  If too few are issued, needs may still be unmet for lack of currency to pay for them, recreating the pathologies of the conventional currency.   How many notes to issue is a delicate decision, and it is unclear who has the right, or knowledge, to make a decision that affects the fundamental integrity of the system.  Some of the more radically-minded currencies decided collectively at open meetings how much currency should be issued.  Regiogeld and Berkshares, which do involve significant numbers of businesses, are formally organised by NGOs, with the support and participation of local banks.  In the UK, some of the transition currencies have suffered from a perception that they are not professionally organised and managed.  Levels of organisation enabling individuals to exchange childcare and gardening are obviously different in both importance and extent when compared with what is necessary to facilitate business to business exchange, and the tax and (potentially) regulatory liabilities associated with that.  

Convertibility.
To maintain the distinctiveness of the complementary currency system, few LETS schemes actively facilitated the transfer of complementary currencies into national currency.  Time Banks prohibited it and refused to make any connection between an hour and national currencies.  The result is that traders with popular services could often be left with a store of unspendable credits.  While participants in Time Banks saw themselves as exchanging favours, and had a relaxed view about their account balance, in LETS, an inability to spend what could be seen as hard earned cash could, in time, become problematic.  This was a particular problem for those able to earn large amounts of a local currency, especially businesses, and acted as a disincentive to their continued participation.  They would stop taking on new work until they had spent their balences, or drop out, writing their balance off. If enough people did this, the network would fail.  Sometimes, for example in Ithaca, the organiser of the currency spent a considerable amount of time working with businesses to help them find new ways to recirculate the currency. In time, it became clear that this was a previously underemphasised managerial requirement for an alternative currency network: while a bank does not need to help account holders to spend their money, there is, in the form of advertising, a considerable infrastructure that does this. 
 	Two more organisational solutions to were also utilised to facilitate the circulation of the currency.  In Germany, Bavaria’s Chiemgauer regional currency is experimenting with demurrage, whereby a currency depreciates, or ‘rusts’, over time unless a stamp or voucher is periodically purchased which revalidates it so at can be spent again.  Inspired by Rudolf Steiner’s views on money, Chiemgauer currency notes are withdrawn from circulation in time, so they cannot be hoarded over long periods.  The advantage of demurrage is that a huge pressure is put onto holders of currency to move it on before the validation date.  The problem is that demurrage can exacerbate the unattractiveness of complementary currencies to those providers of in-demand services who are willing to spend their accumulated credits, but lack opportunities to do so.  A balance losing value over time is likely to ensure that providers of such services quickly cease accepting currency, and disproportionately penalises those who have provided the most services.  Interestingly though, recent evidence from Germany suggests though that in an environment where there physically are many opportunities to trade demurrage can incentivise recirculation   to avoid having to revalidate the notes.
	The second solution to this problem is to have a local paper currency that is fully backed by national currency, which those who struggle to spend can easily exchange back into national currency.  This is the solution taken by BerkShares, and by the transition currencies.  It solves the problem of what to do with unspent balances, but can, in turn, create three new problems.  First, these currencies can only be obtained in exchange for national currency, which is banked, so as to be available for those who later want to change it back.  Why would anyone change universal money into a more limited form of money, unless they had a political or affective commitment to their local economy?  Secondly, those without national currency are still excluded from participation in the network: it is not new, ‘poor people’s money’.   Third, what is the point of having a currency that does not circulate widely through the local economy, but is just banked straight away?  The structuring elements of a local currency are missing: why should a business try to spend the local currency with those with whom they do business if they can just bank it?  One problem is solved, three new ones emerge.
	BerkShares and the transition currencies consequently incentivise new users by offering a favourable exchange rate between local and national currencies: for example, nine dollars bought you ten BerkShares, giving you a ten per cent boost to your spending power.  They disincentivise banking, rather than recirculating the currency as If the business then exchanged them back into US dollars, they would only get nine dollars back for their ten BerkShares.  Businesses that could spend their local currency were not penalised, and many businesses could afford to offer a ten per cent discount: this is normal business practice.  Many businesses reported that the local currency featured prominently in the media, and provided good publicity for the town: the price was worth paying. But businesses that were popular with many users, but who could not spend high volumes of a local currency, struggled with that they began to describe as a ‘ten per cent’ hit.  The E.F. Schumacher Society responded to this by reducing the discount to five per cent, practice replicated by the transition currencies.  This seems more sustainable.   

Commitment-building mechanisms. 
A debate that goes back to the beginning of the modern wave of complementary currencies centres on the question: is this a tool for anyone to use, for whatever they want to, or a community, a social movement arguing for a different form of money that will help to build a sustainable, convivial, low carbon  world? Is it protest, economic development, or a mix of the two?  This has implications for ways of organising the currency network.  Those who see the local currency as a tool for building communities and strengthening local economies are more likely to be interested in a complementary currency that is organised by a democratically accountable management group, that is fairly small, and operates within a geographically tight area or homogenous community.  They are likely to favour those design elements that build community and commitment such as directories and newsletters with a strong 'alternative' or 'community' feel, trading days, and a brokerage service which actively puts members in touch with each other on the Time bank model.  They will enjoy and appreciate strong boundaries: a feeling that the community that uses the currency is distinct or special, and 'doing things in a different way'.  Time Banks are especially strong in providing the organisational structure necessary to mean that vulnerable members are looked after, their needs are met, and that they are protected by a duty of care.
In contrast, those who prefer to use a complementary currency as a ladder into mainstream employment or as a way to strengthen local economies may prefer a larger, more diverse, anonymous community, and feel stifled by commitment building mechanisms that those with a stronger commitment to community may appreciate.  Here, how prospective members find out about the opportunities to use a complementary currency, and what does it mean to use the currency matters.  Which groups in society do those organising the currency target to get them to participate (and why they target some groups not others)?  How does the management group go about developing the range of services available within the currency - if at all?  
LETS groups rarely actively identified target markets and systematically attempted to explain the benefits of complementary currencies to potential new users. Promotional materials were, and still are, are often poorly produced, if at all.  Many LETS groups did little more than rely on their directory to convey the flavour of resources accessible.  Others simply relied on word of mouth.  Often this could be deliberate.  Community-based complementary currency networks relied on significant levels of trust in the absence of methods of enforcing payment, and the personal or home-based nature of many services meant that many users sought assurances that they will feel 'comfortable' with their fellow traders.  Time Banks managed who would and who would not be allowed into the network, often insisting on Criminal Records checks.  Many more radical members of LETS specifically set out to be part of a hidden network of tranquillity and fair exchange, and actively sought to create a border against a wider world 'gone mad', actively opposing any active promotional strategy.  These processes all build a shared identity, but beyond obvious problems with equal opportunities also restrict the size of the network, keep the benefits to a small group, and can cut off new blood, skills and energy.  But if borders were sufficiently porous to let new members in, and commitment building mechanisms (opportunities to meet, communication methods, rules and regulations, punishments for defection, or processes of constructing a group feeling and identity) were strong enough to keep group identity, then a diverse and resilient trading network can emerge that can last over time.  Rosabeth Moss Kantor’s (1972) study of US 19th and 20th century intentional communities identified both borders and commitment building mechanisms as crucial to the longevity of such groups: this remains the case for alternative cu8rrency networks.  




Conclusion: Horses for courses? 
A final issue is to think about what the vision is: a small scale, community or neighbourhood exchange scheme, or a larger economic development tool, perhaps working at a regional level  In Europe or the US, might more robust regional currencies circulate alongside the Euro and dollar, in time becoming perhaps as a real alternative to the dollar or Euro in time of crisis?  Many LETS schemes and Time Banks have evolved over time into sustainable, long lasting exchange networks that meet the needs of their members.  But to address issues of climate change, financial crisis and resource constraint, something else is needed.  We need a diverse ecosystem of complementary currencies that are more finely attuned to the needs of those using them, from the Euro down to the Bobbin.  One size does not fit all.  
Diversity and targeting are necessary as, for example, businesses run by people who do not have a pre-existing ecological or egalitarian political perspective are not likely to be attracted to a small, local, hour-based currency.  Similarly, a currency aligned directly to pound, dollar or Euro is frequently seen as an unwelcome commodification of sharing by those attracted to Time Money.  The list goes on.  Businesses have shown themselves to be attracted to a tightly managed, hard currency - yet few join LETS schemes (and are not targeted by Time Banks).  A community of anarchists is likely to reject any form of currency governance beyond consensus-based grassroots management.  Business will see this as unaccountable, flaky. Businesses will require formal, accountable forms organisation, rules and regulations, and the confidence both that those running the currency know what they are doing, and that they can get their money back if necessary.  Those looking to build communities or help needy groups will want to get together as a community to work out how to collectively meet their needs.  Business will want to use the currency as and when they feel it necessary, without being expected to participate in group identity-building exercises.  
		As well as a diversity or organisational forms, we need a diversity of spatial scales.  Just as social and economic life has spatiality, so do complementary currencies.  Indeed, as local currencies, they have a specific geographical component that currently limits their usage.   Currencies have a moral geography (Lee 1996) – how widely should they circulate?  What is an ‘optimum currency area’ (Mundell 1961) in terms of economic efficiency, and to what extent does an optimal area map onto or clash with socially-constructed conceptions of what is a locality?  How far ‘away’ is ‘too far’, when do ‘we’ end and ‘they’ begin?  LETS members, and to a lesser extent Time Bank users, wish to locate economic relations at a specific geographical scale - the very local, or at the largest extent a city or sub region.  They feel that it is a problem if wealth leaves this particular scale to move to a place where it may secure a higher return.  A community or ecological currency will need to be limited to a local neighbourhood, whereas one facilitate significant business involvement will need to be at least at a city wide level, if not regional, to encompass the full range of supply linkages necessary to make complementary currencies spendable in the absence of existing localised economies.  German Regiogeld operate at a regional level, while BerkShares circulate in the western part of a US state: these seem to be scales that mix an ethical attachment to the ‘local’ at a scale that enough businesses join to make circulations possible.  Generally, the UK transition currencies, at a town level, have struggled to generate much recirculation.  Their borders are too tight.  But conversely, regional currencies are likely to operate at too big a scale for LETS and Time Bank members.  
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^1	  "I'll buy you a pint if you……."
^2	  Although note the recent success of the African M-PESA SMS-based money transfer system in poor communities with affordable mobile phone services 
